

A Case Study in Integrated PMESII Modeling and Simulation

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
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Agenda

- Background – Evaluating CMIST
 - What is CMIST?
 - Evaluation goals
 - Pacifica overview
- PMESII Modeling
 - Modeling methodology
 - PsyOps/MCO model
- Experimental Results
 - Running different COAs
 - COA Comparison & Drilldown
- Lessons Learned
 - Modeling process
 - Tool insights
- Future Work
- Conclusions

CMIST Overview

- Multi-Methodology M&S IDE
 - Modeling tools for authoring, debugging, simulation, visualization, exporting
 - Developer tools for authoring new ontologies, integrating native simulation tools
- Built on proven open standards and C/GOTS
 - Plug-ins to the widely-used Eclipse Java IDE
 - XML, XSD, UML, XDA, OAT



Families of Simulation Methodologies

- Methodologies currently incorporated in tool
 - Cause-effect (AFRL CAT)
 - System Dynamics (U. Berkeley's Ptolemy II)
 - Agent-based modeling (TILab's JADE)
- Methodologies being incorporated this year
 - Bayesian Knowledge Bases (E. Santos, Dartmouth College)
 - Colored Petri Nets
 - Network links to data sources (not really a methodology)
- Extensible libraries
 - Transforms for cross-model data exchange
 - Interaction patterns for synchronizing models with disparate time management

CMIST Evaluation Goals

- Mission Statement
 - Evaluate and assess the **utility, robustness and relevance of CMIST** to provide command-level decision makers the **capability to anticipate and shape future battlespaces**
- Resources
 - CMIST 1.0 from previous effort (see MORSS 75th EBO SS)
 - Unclassified Pacifica dataset (use and augment as needed)
- Specified Tasks
 - Identify scenario-specific requirements, data and models
 - Define models and input data needed to apply CMIST
 - Exercise CMIST PMESII modeling capabilities in a realistic context
 - Evaluate the performance, efficacy and utility of CMIST
 - Strengths and weaknesses
 - Gauge appropriateness for COA generation and assessment
- Endstate
 - CMIST demonstration and tutorial using the Pacifica-based scenario
 - Final report on evaluation criteria and metrics, planning process, tool operation


PMESII Modeling Methodology

1. Develop an issue statement
2. Identify key variables & other data
3. Define reference behavior patterns
4. Develop a structural dynamic hypothesis
5. Build a simulation model
6. Iterate, improve, and implement

Modeling Focus: PsyOps impact on Major Combat Operations

Pacifica Overview

- Red strategy (Califon)
 - **Goal:** Prevent Nevidah development of port of Salt Lake City
 - **Actions:** Invade Nevidah to take mineral fields with conventional military forces
- Blue strategy
 - Ph I: Deterrence through defensive deployment, Info Ops, COIN Ops
 - Ph II & Ph III – Major Combat Ops
 - Ph II: Seize the Initiative through air superiority, begin offensive counter-land
 - Ph III: Decisive Ops: Attrit Califon army, WMD, and offensive capability
 - Ph IV: Transition: Monitor, support, redeploy



1. Issue Statement

- Models will compare **PsyOps** non-kinetic strategies with a conventional scenario of Major Combat Operations (**MCO**)
- Focus on aggregate values such as **Land Area** and **number of personnel**, but create individuals such as **Red Commander** for decision-making
- Model the Califon military organization featuring three levels of hierarchy:
 - Commander
 - Staff
 - Personnel.
- The lower two levels can be influenced by PsyOps campaign, which reduces the will to fight of Califon personnel and staff

2. Key Variables

- A few key variables are listed below. During this stage of the modeling process, we are trying to outline some important features, but we will revisit and add variables as we go
- Califon combat power (personnel + equipment)
 = Califon force factor
- Blue combat power (similar)
- Land gained by Califon (in contested PMF region)
- Califon personnel with will to fight
- Blue personnel and equipment losses
- Califon decisions (invade or not, retreat, etc.)
- Califon Commander

Scenario 1 – MCO with Close Air Support

- Califon invades Nevidah on day 2
 - Califon decisions in Cause-Effect methodology feeds into Agent model of Califon Commander, and decision output of military action and/or surrender feeds into the larger System Dynamics model
 - Nevidah land (mineral fields) under Califon control is a major indicator
- Blue starts MCO on day 30
 - Blue commanders are Agents with deterministic decisions which are played out in the System Dynamics model

Scenario 2 – MCO with PsyOps only targeting Personnel


- Same basic structure as Scenario 1
- PsyOps campaign initiated by Joint Commander on day 18
 - Calfon **Personnel with Will To Fight** targeted by PsyOps campaign (Holdouts are not targeted by campaign)

Scenario 3 – MCO & PsyOps targeting Personnel & Staff


- Same basic structure as Scenario 2
- PsyOps campaign initiated by Joint Commander on day 18
 - Califon **Personnel with Will To Fight** and **Staff with Will To Fight** are both targeted by PsyOps campaign
 - These two organizational levels interact with each other in a **positive feedback fashion**, resulting in much faster rates of demotivation

Califon Decisions – Cause Effect & Agent Model


Cause-Effect structure




Agent structure



Califon Force Factor & Land Gain – System Dynamics (SD)





Major Combat Operations, Blue Forces – SD & Agent



PsyOps/MCO Reference Behavior Patterns – 1


- Reference behavior patterns display historical or expected future values for a variable as a time-series






- Time horizon is zero to 60 days into the future
- Red line shows expected behavior pattern for Califon if no Blue intervention
- Blue line shows expected behavior when Blue launches Major Combat Operations – increasingly steep losses for Califon

Structural Hypothesis – 1

- Force-on-Force interactions apply attrition rates proportional to the force factor ratio (Califon) or its reciprocal (Blue)
- Potential for spiral downwards when your force factor gets smaller




PsyOps/MCO Reference Behavior Patterns – 2




Structural Hypothesis – 2

- PsyOps campaign starts demotivation in Califon personnel & staff
- Which then self-reinforces through social processes such as word-of-mouth and observations of others demotivating




Will To Fight Demotivation Structure – SD


Positive feedback growth loop of Demotivated Personnel




Califon Will To Fight / Blue MCO Model




When Califon attacks & Probability of continuing to fight



**COA 1 – MCO with
Close Air Support**




**COA 2 – MCO +
PsyOps on Personnel**




**COA 3 - MCO + PsyOps
on Personnel & Staff**


Red and Blue force factors



COA 1 – MCO with Close Air Support




COA 2 – MCO + PsyOps on Personnel




COA 3 - MCO + PsyOps on Personnel & Staff


Land under Califon control



COA 1 – MCO with Close Air Support




COA 2 – MCO + PsyOps on Personnel




COA 3 - MCO + PsyOps on Personnel & Staff


Total Califon personnel (including holdouts)



COA 1 – MCO with Close Air Support




COA 2 – MCO + PsyOps on Personnel




COA 3 - MCO + PsyOps on Personnel & Staff


Personnel with will to fight (not including holdouts)



COA 1 – MCO with Close Air Support




COA 2 – MCO + PsyOps on Personnel




COA 3 - MCO + PsyOps on Personnel & Staff


Red vs. Blue casualties by attrition



COA 1 – MCO with Close Air Support



COA 2 – MCO + PsyOps on Personnel



COA 3 - MCO + PsyOps on Personnel & Staff


Modeling Lessons Learned

- Promising initial results mixing modeling methodologies
 - Successfully demonstrates CE-SD-Agent interactions
 - Combines native tools with discrete vs. aggregate time management
- Useful results on Califon/Blue MCO/PsyOps model
 - Demonstrates ability to model soft factors, such as psychological influence campaign on adversary and the resulting social dynamics
 - Can mix probabilistic Cause-Effect trees with Agent logic structures to represent decision-making under uncertainty
 - Can test assumptions, both structural and numerical, in experiments:
 - What happens if we increase the effort in PsyOps? (numerical)
 - What if we start PsyOps earlier, or later? (numerical)
 - What outcomes result if we target adversary officers/staff in PsyOps campaign as well as their personnel? (structural)
- Other modeling work
 - Earlier work with CMIST generated a PMESII notional insurgency model, demonstrating effects of unemployment, insurgent recruitment, and impacts of aid programs
 - Usable for modeling DIME, PMESII, counter-insurgency, information ops, etc.

Tool Lessons Learned

- CMIST provides a rich platform for PMESII model integration
 - M&S developers IDE to rapidly integrate new native simulation tools (on the order of a few weeks)
 - Commander's IDE for rapid model authoring, execution, and refinement (develop simulating models in as little time as a few hours)
- CMIST lacks some features of more-developed simulation tools
 - Syntax checking of model equations, arbitrary lookup functions, saving simulation data for reuse & comparison, multi-level display of node-link models, sensitivity testing, optimization, etc.
 - We are addressing some of these features in CyberCAFE
- Leveraging open-source community's work
 - But need to be careful to mark your code so you can update to new releases
- Enthusiastic response from Air Force SME; potential future as modeling tool for rapid construction of low-overhead models

Future Work



CyberCAFE – Cyber-PMESII Commander's Assessment of Forecast Effects

- Unified cyber-PMESII modeling environment built on CMIST IDE
- Intent Modeling for friendly, neutral, adversary agents
- Temporal Bayesian Knowledge Bases capture beliefs, rationales, actions, effects (what, why, how)
- Embedded agent simulations distinct from main world enable complex deception strategies
- Colored Petri Nets enable information flow modeling for cyber-COA analysis
- Connection to Live Data Sources, Web-based or database sources to inform model inputs
- Comparative observational data helps validate model outputs

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 - Mike Cook (SW Lead)
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 - Mike Cook, Andrew Seidel (Developers)
 - James Melhuish, Nicholas Pioch (Modelers)

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